



Economic Integration and Mass Migration, 1994–Present

With international trade, immigration debates, and drug violence routinely making headlines in the twenty-first century, there can be no doubt that the history of North America's borders and borderlands is still being made.

This final chapter addresses major issues concerning the continent's borders in the recent past and present. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, a new era of cooperation and mutuality for North America seemed in the offing. The most visible sign of this cooperation was the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. The purpose of NAFTA was to unite Canada, the United States, and Mexico into a free trade block with minimal tariffs and restrictions on one another's products. The most ambitious of NAFTA proponents saw it as a way of transcending past divisions, particularly between the United States and Mexico, and perhaps even as a first step toward political cooperation and coordination, as with the European Union. In this view, the borders that divided the three nations would matter less and less as they all worked toward an era of shared economic prosperity brought about by trade liberalization.

Not everybody was so optimistic. NAFTA was controversial within Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Mexican and Canadian critics charged that it would lead to economic domination by American companies and thus to an erosion of their national culture and sovereignty. Mexican opponents denounced the ruling party's pursuit of this agreement as proof that it had abandoned the principles of the Mexican revolution for the seductive embrace of the free-market ideology so dominant north of the border. Labor advocates from all three nations feared that it would lead to a race to the bottom for wages and working conditions. Canadian and American environmentalists similarly argued that it would gut environmental standards by encouraging companies to relocate to Mexico to avoid environmental regulation and enforcement, and also possibly by striking down environmental laws as restraints of trade.

Nevertheless, NAFTA was approved by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. After it went into force on January 1, 1994, most tariffs and restrictions on commerce between the three nations were phased out. The increased mobility of capital, goods, and financial services allowed by the agreement, however, did not apply to labor.

The American economy attracted far more Mexican workers than American law allowed to enter the country. Moreover, highly capitalized and subsidized American agriculture made the operation of hundreds of thousands of small farms in Mexico economically unviable, prompting many of these farmers to move in search of work, first to Mexican cities and then often to the United States. So illegal immigration continued to grow, provoking controversy on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexican society and officials had long looked askance at those who left for America, seeing them as embarrassing reminders of economic backwardness at best, and downright traitors to the nation at worst. But, by the 1990s, it was increasingly difficult to deny that emigration also greatly benefitted Mexico, particularly in the form of remittances, money sent home by those working abroad, which by most calculations had come to rival petroleum exports as Mexico's largest source of foreign capital. Particularly after the 2000 election of Vicente Fox, the first president from an opposition party since the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican state began to accept the permanent presence of millions of its nationals in the United States as a fact of life. The Mexican government extended itself on their behalf by providing them with identification cards, heightened consular protection, and voting rights even when abroad.

Within the United States, debates over Mexican immigration grew more heated. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., shifted American priorities away from economic integration and toward national security concerns. Although none of the hijackers had entered the United States by crossing either of its land borders, there were many calls for more vigorous border policing. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, which administers U.S. immigration law, was placed under Homeland Security, an agency charged with defense against terrorism. The American and Mexican governments had begun work on comprehensive immigration reform—some new system of immigration law that would address what most viewed as the problem of more than ten million Mexicans living in the United States without legal permission. But with the American government focused on 9-11 and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, no further progress was made on this issue. NAFTA's trade regime remained in place, but the momentum toward greater North American integration had been reversed.

The United States began experiencing an intense anti-immigrant backlash. Nativism—opposition to the foreign-born—had not been this strong in American society since the 1920s. Anti-immigration organizations called for mass deportations and for a reconsideration of the constitutional provision that all those born on U.S. soil were automatically U.S. citizens. In response to such sentiments, the federal government increased raids on workplaces employing illegal immigrants, and residents of several states passed ballot initiatives to deny public services such as education and medical treatment to those who could not prove their legal status. A handful of municipalities in Pennsylvania and Texas sought to enforce immigration law by banning the renting of apartments to illegal aliens, although federal courts held that immigration law is a federal matter and thus found these laws unconstitutional. A 2010 law in Arizona went further than any previous measure in its requirements that immigrants carry authorization papers at all times and that police routinely check the immigration status of people they have reason to believe are in the country illegally. Hispanic civil rights organizations filed suit to block implementation of the law and charged that it would lead to rampant racial profiling and harassment of all Latinos.

Because these disputes concerned on Latin American immigration, they focused on the U.S.-Mexico border. But many of the new restrictions and border policing applied to the

U.S.-Canada border as well, to the consternation of many Canadians. The politics of border enforcement had become some of the leading and most divisive questions across the United States and between Americans, Mexicans, and Canadians. In that sense, the borderlands were everywhere.

DOCUMENTS

The first document excerpts a speech given by U.S. President Bill Clinton on the signing of NAFTA. Clinton praises the creation of a continental free trade zone as a step towards prosperity and peace not only for the United States, but also as a model for a new global era of openness and free trade. When goods and services can easily and quickly cross national borders, Clinton argued, economic competition and prosperity would be the end results. In Document 2, Gene Karpinski, the head of the Public Interest Research Group, and J. Michael McCloskey, the chair of the Sierra Club, urge the U.S. Congress to vote against NAFTA. Their arguments that open borders would lead to the gutting of environmental standards were characteristic of Canadian and American opponents of the trade agreement.

The migration of workers north from Mexico was one reflection of continued North American economic integration, if not one that was provided for in the terms of NAFTA. Migrants faced numerous obstacles, including robbery, corrupt officials, and physical violence. Document 3 is a newspaper article describing some of Mexican President Vicente Fox's efforts to address these challenges. His public embrace of migrants as "heroes" symbolized the Mexican government's widely publicized reversal of silence or hostility toward migrants.

If migration to the United States was becoming more accepted in Mexico, then the opposite was the case in the United States. Document 4 is Congressional testimony from the founder of an organization called the Minute Man Civil Defense Corps, originally formed in 2004 to patrol the Mexican border against unlawful migrants. Named to invoke the Americans who fought for independence in the Revolutionary War, the organization portrayed those entering the country illegally as invaders and threats to national security. These concerns had great resonance in a country still shaken by 9-11, even for many who did not endorse the organization's advocacy of vigilantism.

If the minutemen and others saw immigration policy through the lens of national security, then others believed that racism and xenophobia were more central to these debates. In Document 5, *New York Times* economics reporter David Leonhardt accuses Lou Dobbs, then a popular news anchor at the Cable News Network (CNN), and perhaps the most prominent opponent of immigration, of deception and giving a platform to white supremacists, linking him to a long strain of American nativists dating back to anti-Irish and anti-Chinese agitation in the nineteenth century. A year and a half later, Dobbs left CNN, whose management had grown concerned that his strong stances on immigration and other issues were compromising its journalistic integrity.

One of the most important political victories gained by those who perceived illegal immigration to be a threat to U.S. national security was a 2006 measure

providing for the construction of a wall along the border with Mexico. Document 6 is a newspaper article about the response of the Tohon O'odham (Pima) government to this measure. O'odham leaders had long asserted the right of their people to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, which divided their traditional homeland and split the tribe into American and Mexican divisions. Critics of the wall widely echoed the O'odham spokesperson's condemnation of the waiver of environmental and labor laws in its construction.

Heightened immigration enforcement did not reduce the number of Mexicans coming into the United States. This number began to lag only with the severe recession of 2008, following the same pattern of labor demand that Mexican migration had established since the Mexican Revolution. But the process of entering the United States had become much more dangerous than in previous decades. The vast desert expanses of the Arizona-Sonora portion of the border became the primary conduit for migrants. By the early twenty-first century, on average, at least one person trying to reach the United States died each day. Document 7 is an excerpt of writer Luis Alberto Urrea's book *The Devil's Highway*, the story of a group of men from Veracruz who crossed into southern Arizona in May 2001. Fourteen of the party of twenty-six perished in the attempt. Based on extensive interviews with the survivors and the Border Patrol agents who found them, Urrea reconstructs their ordeal, hoping that his searing account will remind all who read it of the need to reckon with the human toll of migration policies.

Other factors also brought violence and suffering to the U.S.-Mexico border. In Document 8 writer Sam Quinones describes the mysterious and terrifying murders of hundreds of women in the Mexican border city Ciudad Juárez. Quinones links debates over these murders to the city's rapid industrialization and the consequent influx of young, single women workers. In the years since the article's publication, both the murders and local anger at the inability or unwillingness of the authorities to solve them have continued. In Document 9, the *New York Times* describes the increasing violence of the drug trade. Although drug traffic in Mexico exists mostly to serve the American market for illegal drugs, most of the violence associated with the cartels occurs in Mexico. This violence has sharply increased since 2006, provoking controversy and anger in both Mexico and the United States. The scale and scope of this violence suggests that neither of the countries—nor both of them acting together—can control their shared border.

1. U.S. President Bill Clinton Praises Free Trade Agreement, 1993

This whole issue turned out to be a defining moment for our Nation. I spoke with one of the folks who was in the reception just a few moments ago who told me that he was in China watching the vote on international television when it was taken. And he said you would have had to be there to understand how important this was to the rest of the world, not because of the terms of NAFTA, which basically is a trade agreement between the United States, Mexico, and

Canada, but because it became a symbolic struggle for the spirit of our country and for how we would approach this very difficult and rapidly changing world dealing with our own considerable challenges here at home.

I believe we have made a decision now that will permit us to create an economic order in the world that will promote more growth, more equality, better preservation of the environment, and a greater possibility of world peace. We are on the verge of a global economic expansion that is sparked by the fact that the United States lit this critical moment decided that we would compete, not retreat.

In a few moments, I will sign the North American free trade act into law. NAFTA will tear down trade barriers between our three nations. It will create the world's largest trade zone and create 200,000 jobs in this country by 1995 alone. The environmental and labor side agreements negotiated by our administration will make this agreement a force for social progress as well as economic growth. Already the confidence we've displayed by ratifying NAFTA has begun to bear fruit. We are now making real progress toward a worldwide trade agreement so significant that it could make the material gains of NAFTA for our country look small by comparison.

Today we have the chance to do what our parents did before us. We have the opportunity to remake the world. For this new era, our national security we now know will be determined as much by our ability to pull down foreign trade barriers as by our ability to breach distant ramparts. Once again, we are leading. And in so doing, we are rediscovering a fundamental truth about ourselves: When we lead, we build security, we build prosperity for our own people.

We've learned this lesson the hard way. Twice before in this century, we have been forced to define our role in the world. After World War I we turned inward, building walls of protectionism around our Nation. The result was a Great Depression and ultimately another horrible World War. After the Second World War, we took a different course: We reached outward. Gifted leaders of both political parties built a new order based on collective security and expanded trade. They created a foundation of stability and created in the process the conditions which led to the explosion of the great American middle class, one of the true economic miracles in the whole history of civilization. Their statecraft stands to this day: the IMF and the World Bank, GATT, and NATO.

In this very auditorium in 1949, President Harry Truman signed one of the charter documents of this golden era of American leadership, the North Atlantic Treaty that created NATO. "In this pact we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression," told his audience, "a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of Government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for our citizens."

Now, the institutions built by Truman and Acheson, by Marshall and Vandenberg, have accomplished their task. The cold war is over. The grim certitude of the contest with communism has been replaced by the exuberant uncertainty of international economic competition. And the great question of this day is how to ensure security for our people at a time when change is the only constant.

Make no mistake, the global economy with all of its promise and perils is now the central fact of life for hard-working Americans. It has enriched the lives of millions of Americans. But for too many those same winds of change have

worn away at file basis of their security. For two decades, most people have worked harder for less. Seemingly secure jobs have been lost. And while America once again is the most productive nation on Earth, this productivity itself holds the seeds of further insecurity. After all, productivity means the same people can produce more or, very often, that fewer people can produce more. This is the world we face.

We cannot stop global change. We cannot repeal the international economic competition that is everywhere. We can only harness the energy to our benefit. Now we must recognize that the only way for a wealthy nation to grow richer is to export, to simply find new customers for the products and services it makes. That, my fellow Americans, is the decision the Congress made when they voted to ratify NAFTA.

I am gratified with the work that Congress has done this year, bringing the deficit down and keeping interest rates down, getting housing starts and new jobs going upward. But we know that over the long run, our ability to have our internal economic policies work for the benefit of our people requires us to have external economic policies that permit productivity to find expression not simply in higher incomes for our businesses but in more jobs and higher incomes for our people. That means more customers. There is no other way, not for the United States or for Europe or for Japan or for any other wealthy nation in the world.

That is why I am gratified that we had such a good meeting after the NAFTA vote in the House with the Asian-Pacific leaders in Washington. I am gratified that, as Vice President Gore and Chief of Staff Mack McLarty announced 2 weeks ago when they met with President Salinas, next year the nations of this hemisphere will gather in an economic summit that will plan how to extend the benefits of trade to the emerging market democracies of all the Americas.

And now I am pleased that we have the opportunity to secure the biggest breakthrough of all. Negotiators from 112 nations are seeking to conclude negotiations on a new round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; a historic world trade pact, one that would spur a global economic boon, is now within our grasp. Let me be clear. We cannot, nor should we, settle for a bad GATT agreement. But we will not flag in our efforts to secure a good one in these closing days. We are prepared to make our contributions to the success of this negotiation, but we insist that other nations do their part as well. We must not squander this opportunity. I call on all the nations of the world to seize this moment and close the deal on a strong GATT agreement within the next week.

I say to everyone, even to our negotiators: Don't rest. Don't sleep. Close the deal. I told Mickey Kantor the other day that we rewarded his laborious effort on NAFTA with a vacation at the GATT talks. [Laughter]

My fellow Americans, bit by bit all these things are creating the conditions of a sustained global expansion. As significant as they are, our goals must be more ambitious. The United States must seek nothing less than a new trading system that benefits all nations through robust commerce but that protects our middle class and gives other nations a chance to grow one, that lifts workers and the environment up without dragging people down, that seeks to ensure that our policies reflect our values.

Our agenda must, therefore, be far reaching. We are determining that dynamic trade cannot lead to environmental despoliation. We will seek new institutional arrangements to ensure that trade leaves the world cleaner than before. We will press for workers in all countries to secure rights that we now take for granted, to organize and earn a decent living. We will insist that expanded trade be fair to our businesses and to our regions. No country should use cartels, subsidies, or rules of entry to keep our products off its shelves. And we must see to it that our citizens have the personal security to confidently participate in this new era. Every worker must receive the education and training he or she needs to reap the rewards of international competition rather than to bear its burdens.

Next year, our administration will propose comprehensive legislation to transform our unemployment system into a reemployment and job retraining system for the 21st century. And above all, I say to you we must seek to reconstruct the broad-based political coalition for expanded trade. For decades, working men and women and their representatives supported policies that brought us prosperity and security. That was because we recognized that expanded trade benefited all of us but that we have an obligation to protect those workers who do bear the brunt of competition by giving them a chance to be retrained and to go on to a new and different and, ultimately, more secure and more rewarding way of work. In recent years, this social contract has been sundered.

It cannot continue.

When I affix my signature to the NAFTA legislation a few moments from now, I do so with this pledge: To the men and women of our country who were afraid of these changes and found in their opposition to NAFTA an expression of that fear—what I thought was a wrong expression and what I know was a wrong expression but nonetheless represented legitimate fears—the gains from this agreement will be your gains, too.

I ask those who opposed NAFTA to work with us to guarantee that the labor and side agreements are enforced, and I call on all of us who believe in NAFTA to join with me to urge the Congress to create the world's best worker training and retraining system. We owe it to the business community as well as to the working men and women of this country. It means greater productivity, lower unemployment, greater worker efficiency, and higher wages and greater security for our people. We have to do that.

We seek a new and more open global trading system not for its own sake but for our own sake. Good jobs, rewarding careers, broadened horizons for the middle class Americans can only be secured by expanding exports and global growth. For too long our step has been unsteady as the ground has shifted beneath our feet. Today, as I sign the North American Free Trade Agreement into law and call for further progress on GATT, I believe we have found our footing. And I ask all of you to be steady, to recognize that there is no turning back from the world of today and tomorrow. We must face the challenges, embrace them with confidence, deal with the problems honestly and openly, and make this world work for all of us. America is where it should be, in the lead, setting the pace, showing the confidence that all of us need to face tomorrow. We are ready to compete, and we can win.

2. Environmental Groups Warn of Damage from NAFTA, 1993

For decades, the environmental community has fought for a clean and safe environment. Laws to promote recycling, prevent pollution, protect endangered species and ensure safe food are just a few of the cornerstones of environmental successes. But the North American Free Trade Agreement could significantly weaken or wholly reverse these actions.

Many environmental laws operate by ensuring that imported goods are safe for our consumption. A case in point is the Delaney clause, which says that certain foods must be 100% free of cancer-causing pesticides. Many pesticide residues that are prohibited in the United States are allowed on Mexican produce.

Under NAFTA, the Mexican government could challenge our law as a barrier to free trade. The safety of our food supply could be determined by a panel of bureaucrats behind closed doors without public input. That's undemocratic and unacceptable.

NAFTA could encourage companies to relocate to areas where both standards and enforcement are lax. To keep those corporations in their communities, local and state regulators within the USA will be pressured to give in to industry demands on environmental regulation.

These fundamental problems have not been fixed by the environmental side agreement. In fact, it is so tortuous and riddled with loopholes it's doubtful enforcement fines ever will be applied.

A broad-based coalition of environmental, consumer and conservation groups opposes NAFTA because it will assault the laws that protect our forests, wildlife, air and water, and that keep our food safe to eat. NAFTA may mean "free trade" to multinational corporations, but it means environmental headaches for the rest of us.

3. Mexican President Defends Migrants

Mexican President Vicente Fox flew to the U.S. border yesterday to welcome home Mexicans and Mexican Americans for the Christmas holidays, and assure them that an ugly tradition would end. Many emigrants arrive in Mexico bearing gifts, and they often fall prey to extortion by Mexican customs agents, immigration officials and police. The extortion is going to stop, Fox assured returnees and about 400 government workers at a roadside customs checkpoint about 12 miles south of the Arizona border.

"There are certainly antecedents that don't speak well of public servants," Fox said.

"We want to get changes in behavior where it's necessary, and we want to come to salute these heroes who left their homes with tears in their eyes to look

Gene Karpinski and J. Michael McCloskey, "Reject NAFTA Pollution," *USA Today*, Sep. 21, 1993, p. A 12. Reprinted with permission.

Morris Thompson, "Mexico's Leader Courts Emigrants at Border Towns," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Dec. 13, 2000, p. A 38.

for a job, to look for an opportunity they didn't find in their own country. We respect them. We love them," said Fox, whose election ousted the party that had ruled Mexico for more than seven decades.

Fox's courtship of the millions of Mexicans who live and work in the United States, legally and illegally, is not just for their benefit. The money they wire home is Mexico's third-largest source of income after oil and tourism. Fox has urged them to invest money in their hometowns to bolster the nation's economy.

Historically, many returning Mexicans have been extorted not just at the border but also at checkpoints, like the one Fox visited, set up to control the flow of weapons, drugs and other contraband. Mariano Chavez Bernal, 30, a U.S. citizen since 1996, said at the checkpoint visited by Fox that he had been a victim in past years. "This time, [border authorities] were very nice to us, maybe because the president is here," Chavez said.

Two years ago, he was forced to pay, he said. "It was terrible, right here," said Chavez, who earns \$7.50 an hour working six days a week as a farmworker in Royal City, Wash. "They took a lot of money—\$20, \$30—four times."

For low-paid Mexican border officials, such money is a major source of income.

An estimated 1.5 million Mexicans will cross into Mexico over the two-month period that began Nov. 20, including up to 400,000 who have entered the United States illegally.

Juan Hernandez, chief of a new presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, said Fox was sincere in his efforts to protect returnees.

"Vicente Fox has said that he's here to supervise and check out that things are done the right way, but also to set the example," Hernandez said. "Police in Guanajuato [state] don't accept bribes anymore. It took a year and a half to filter down, but now they don't." Fox served as governor of Guanajuato before pursuing the presidency.

Hernandez said surveys indicated that returnees were being treated better so far this Christmas season. Fox visited two checkpoints yesterday south of Nogales, which is across the border from a smaller Arizona town of the same name. He will take his message today to Ciudad Juarez, across from El Paso, Texas; and to Nuevo Laredo, across from Laredo, Texas.

4. Minuteman Defense Corps Calls for Vigilante Border Enforcement, 2005

Almost four years after the terrible terrorist attacks upon our country on September 11, 2001, citizens of the United States remain concerned about our national security, specifically our outrageously porous international border with Mexico. Those who live along the border-state region with Mexico have great

concern for their personal safety as well as concern over the lack of border security.

Despite repeated warning from citizens, local law enforcement and various public officials, our border remains intolerably porous and presents not only a threat to public safety but also a clear and present danger to the security of our nation. Millions of dollars have been thrown at the problem and new technology has been promised—some delivered, some conspicuously absent. Citizens who live with daily incursions of illegal aliens through our property and into the sparsely populated back country along the border realize one thing: the Department of Homeland security cannot effectively stop migrant workers, mothers carrying small children, vicious drug smugglers, known criminals and human smugglers from breaching our security—we do not feel confident that our government is able to stop terrorist elements from entering our country with the intent of inflicting harm upon our citizens.

After years of writing letters, sending faxes, sending e-mails and making countless phone calls to elected officials pleading, begging and demanding redress of our grievances, frustration led us to but one conclusion—we must act and address the problem with a citizen movement.

In November of 2002, I, Chris Simcox, began assembling a group of citizens to undertake the responsibility in assisting what we realized was a Border Patrol woefully undermanned and, as it stood, unable to provide for the safety of the citizens of our local community, Cochise County, Arizona.

We now consider the movement to be a revival of the Civil Defense movement of the World War II era. While our troops are fighting on foreign soil, while our Department of Homeland Security applies its resources and efforts to provide for our national security in other areas, we the people will take up the slack by developing civil defense volunteers to support the U.S. Border Patrol.

We consider this a no-compromise situation. Until the time that congress appropriates sufficient funding and develops personnel levels to the numbers needed to effectively secure our borders, we the people will roll up our sleeves in the time-honored tradition and creed of a “cando” society, and we will assist until honorably relieved from duty by the government of the United States.

Only one scenario is possible in convincing citizens to return to our normal everyday lives: deployment of U.S. military reserves and or assigning National Guard personnel, to augment a woefully understaffed Border patrol; only this will convince ordinary citizens to retire from this endeavor.

5. Reporter Questions Television Anchor's Anti-Immigration Crusade, 2007

The whole controversy involving Lou Dobbs and leprosy started with a “60 Minutes” segment a few weeks ago.

David Leonhardt, “Truth, Fiction, and Lou Dobbs,” *New York Times*, May 30, 2007, p. C 1.
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The segment was a profile of Mr. Dobbs, and while doing background research for it, a "60 Minutes" producer came across a 2005 news report from Mr. Dobbs's CNN program on contagious diseases. In the report, one of Mr. Dobbs's correspondents said there had been 7,000 cases of leprosy in this country over the previous three years, far more than in the past.

When Lesley Stahl of "60 Minutes" sat down to interview Mr. Dobbs on camera, she mentioned the report and told him that there didn't seem to be much evidence for it.

"Well, I can tell you this," he replied. "If we reported it, it's a fact."

With that Orwellian chestnut, Mr. Dobbs escalated the leprosy dispute into a full-scale media brouhaha. The next night, back on his own program, the same CNN correspondent who had done the earlier report, Christine Romans, repeated the 7,000 number, and Mr. Dobbs added that, if anything, it was probably an underestimate. A week later, the Southern Poverty Law Center—the civil rights group that has long been critical of Mr. Dobbs—took out advertisements in *The New York Times* and *USA Today* demanding that CNN run a correction.

Finally, Mr. Dobbs played host to two top officials from the law center on his program, "Lou Dobbs Tonight," where he called their accusations outrageous and they called him wrong, unfair and "one of the most popular people on the white supremacist Web sites."

We'll get to the merits of the charges and countercharges shortly, but first it's worth considering why, beyond entertainment value, all this matters. Over the last few years, Lou Dobbs has transformed himself into arguably this country's foremost populist. It's an odd role, given that he spent the 1980s and '90s buttering up chief executives on CNN, but he's now playing it very successfully. He has become a voice for the real economic anxiety felt by many Americans.

The audience for his program has grown 72 percent since 2003, and CBS—yes, the same network that broadcasts "60 Minutes"—just hired him as a commentator on "The Early Show." Many elites, as Mr. Dobbs likes to call them, despise him, but others see him as a hero. His latest book, "War on the Middle Class," was a best seller and received a sympathetic review in this newspaper. Mario Cuomo has said Mr. Dobbs is "addicted to economic truth."

Mr. Dobbs argues that the middle class has many enemies: corporate lobbyists, greedy executives, wimpy journalists, corrupt politicians. But none play a bigger role than illegal immigrants. As he sees it, they are stealing our jobs, depressing our wages and even endangering our lives.

That's where leprosy comes in.

"The invasion of illegal aliens is threatening the health of many Americans," Mr. Dobbs said on his April 14, 2005, program. From there, he introduced his original report that mentioned leprosy, the flesh-destroying disease—technically known as Hansen's disease—that has inspired fear for centuries.

According to a woman CNN identified as a medical lawyer named Dr. Madeleine Cosman, leprosy was on the march. As Ms. Romans, the CNN correspondent, relayed: "There were about 900 cases of leprosy for 40 years. There have been 7,000 in the past three years."

"Incredible," Mr. Dobbs replied.

Mr. Dobbs and Ms. Romans engaged in a nearly identical conversation a few weeks ago, when he was defending himself the night after the "60 Minutes" segment. "Suddenly, in the past three years, America has more than 7,000 cases of leprosy," she said, again attributing the number to Ms. Cosman.

To sort through all this, I called James L. Krahenbuhl, the director of the National Hansen's Disease Program, an arm of the federal government. Leprosy in the United States is indeed largely a disease of immigrants who have come from Asia and Latin America. And the official leprosy statistics do show about 7,000 diagnosed cases—but that's over the last 30 years, not the last three.

The peak year was 1983, when there were 456 cases. After that, reported cases dropped steadily, falling to just 76 in 2000. Last year, there were 137.

"It is not a public health problem—that's the bottom line," Mr. Krahenbuhl told me. "You've got a country of 300 million people. This is not something for the public to get alarmed about." Much about the disease remains unknown, but researchers think people get it through prolonged close contact with someone who already has it.

What about the increase over the last six years, to 137 cases from 76? Is that significant?

"No," Mr. Krahenbuhl said. It could be a statistical fluctuation, or it could be a result of better data collection in recent years. In any event, the 137 reported cases last year were fewer than in any year from 1975 to 1996.

So Mr. Dobbs was flat-out wrong. And when I spoke to him yesterday, he admitted as much, sort of. I read him Ms. Romans's comment—the one with the word "suddenly" in it—and he replied, "I think that is wrong." He then went on to say that as far as he was concerned, he had corrected the mistake by later broadcasting another report, on the same night as his on-air confrontation with the Southern Poverty Law Center officials. This report mentioned that leprosy had peaked in 1983.

Of course, he has never acknowledged on the air that his program presented false information twice. Instead, he lambasted the officials from the law center for saying he had. Even yesterday, he spent much of our conversation emphasizing that there really were 7,000 cases in the leprosy registry, the government's 30-year database. Mr. Dobbs is trying to have it both ways.

I have been somewhat taken aback about how shameless he has been during the whole dispute, so I spent some time reading transcripts from old episodes of "Lou Dobbs Tonight." The way he handled leprosy, it turns out, is not all that unusual.

For one thing, Mr. Dobbs has a somewhat flexible relationship with reality. He has said, for example, that one-third of the inmates in the federal prison system are illegal immigrants. That's wrong, too. According to the Justice Department, 6 percent of prisoners in this country are noncitizens (compared with 7 percent of the population). For a variety of reasons, the crime rate is actually lower among immigrants than natives.

Second, Mr. Dobbs really does give airtime to white supremacy sympathizers. Ms. Cosman, who is now deceased, was a lawyer and Renaissance studies

scholar, never a medical doctor or a leprosy expert. She gave speeches in which she said that Mexican immigrants had a habit of molesting children. Back in their home villages, she would explain, rape was not as serious a crime as cow stealing. The Southern Poverty Law Center keeps a list of other such guests from “Lou Dobbs Tonight.”

Finally, Mr. Dobbs is fond of darkly hinting that this country is under attack. He suggested last week that the new immigration bill in Congress could be the first step toward a new nation—a “North American union”—that combines the United States, Canada and Mexico. On other occasions, his program has described a supposed Mexican plot to reclaim the Southwest. In one such report, one of his correspondents referred to a Utah visit by Vicente Fox, then Mexico’s president, as a “Mexican military incursion.”

When I asked Mr. Dobbs about this yesterday, he said, “You’ve raised this to a level that frankly I find offensive.”

The most common complaint about him, at least from other journalists, is that his program combines factual reporting with editorializing. But I think this misses the point. Americans, as a rule, are smart enough to handle a program that mixes opinion and facts. The problem with Mr. Dobbs is that he mixes opinion and untruths. He is the heir to the nativist tradition that has long used fiction and conspiracy theories as a weapon against the Irish, the Italians, the Chinese, the Jews and, now, the Mexicans.

There is no denying that this country’s immigration system is broken. But it defies belief—and a whole lot of economic research—to suggest that the problems of the middle class stem from illegal immigrants. Those immigrants, remember, are largely non-English speakers without a high school diploma. They have probably hurt the wages of native-born high school dropouts and made everyone else better off.

More to the point, if Mr. Dobbs’s arguments were really so good, don’t you think he would be able to stick to the facts? And if CNN were serious about being “the most trusted name in news,” as it claims to be, don’t you think it would be big enough to issue an actual correction?

6. Tribal Government Condemns Border Wall, 2008

The Tohono O’odham Nation, the second largest Indian reservation recognized by the U.S. with territory and members on both sides of the U.S.–Mexico border, is calling for a halt in the construction of a fence along the Southwest border.

“As original people of the territory, the Tohono O’odham have lived on and cared for that land long before such a boundary even existed; before there was a U.S. or a Mexico,” Ofelia Rivas, a representative of the Indian tribe, said Thursday in Washington.

"Now, however, the construction of the border wall along the entire U.S.-Mexican border is splitting border communities and indigenous nations alike, including the Tohono O'odham," Ms. Rivas said during a press conference.

The Tohono O'odham Reservation, whose 24,000 members live on 2.8 million acres on both sides of the Arizona border south of Tucson, is comparable in size to the state of Connecticut. It said the proposed border fence would "destroy the Tohono O'odham way of life, its traditions and religious practices," along with the "many rights sworn to the O'odham people that are being violated."

"This wall and the construction of this wall has destroyed our communities, our burial sites and ancient O'odham routes throughout our lands," Ms. Rivas said. "The entire international border has divided and displaced our people.

"The wall also is severely affecting the animals. We now see mountain lions going into areas where people live because of the wall," she said.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has said his goal is to have actual fencing along 370 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border and barriers that would allow foot traffic but prevent vehicles on another 300 miles before the end of President Bush's term, which ends in January. Mr. Chertoff has waived dozens of federal laws and regulations to build the fence.

But Tohono O'odham elders and traditionalists maintain their legacy through oral history, conducting natural ceremonies that include offerings to the land and sea. They also use many of the region's plants and environmental resources as a source of food and medicine. Many of these sacred ceremonies take place in Mexico.

Ms. Rivas said the right of the Tohono O'odham people to travel freely and safely over traditional routes in their territory had been guaranteed under U.S., Mexican and International Law. She said the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 acknowledges the rights of the O'odham people that the fence violates.

"By restricting the mobility of the O'odham people, the wall prevents the free practice of their religion and their cultural traditions. Further, rights granted by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Human Rights for Indigenous Peoples, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man are also being ignored due to a waiver issued by the Department of Homeland Security," she said.

"Under this document, the president claims the power to waive any and all environmental and federal Indian laws in order to build the wall in the name of national security," she said.

Ms. Rivas also said the construction has increased the military presence within the O'odham territory, further affecting their lives and communities.

"This wall has militarized our entire lands," she said. "We, as original people, are now required to answer to United States armed forces as to our nationality on our own lands."

Ms. Rivas said that once she was asked at gunpoint to produce identification to establish her right to be on the lands where she was born and where her ancestors lived since before Columbus arrived.

Ms. Rivas is in Washington with members of many different indigenous nations and allies who walked from San Francisco to Washington in what was billed as “The People’s Walk” to protest the fence.

7. Author Describes Death of Migrants in Arizona Desert, 2004

TUESDAY, MAY 22.

It was the high spike of the heat wave. The temperatures burned up through the nineties with the sunrise. By midmorning, it was 100 degrees. By noon, 105. By two o’clock, it was 108 degrees.

They walked.

Nahum Landa Ortiz: “I didn’t watch the first ones die. Two died apart from us. They were behind us and I didn’t see them die.”

He says the guides took five men with them when they left. But they didn’t. The group was fracturing, and small cells were moving into the landscape on their own. Francisco Morales says, “We started throwing things away. We were going to die. We threw away the things in our pockets in despair.”

Edgar Martinez, who didn’t have a phone at home, who had to be reached if anyone called through the phone booth in Cuauhtepac, a village with the name “Hill of the Eagle,” middle name Adrian, nephew of José Isidro Colorado, in love with Claudia Reyes, son of Eugenio, stumbled. He righted himself and put out a hand and fell into a bush. He got to his knees, grimaced as if smiling. Perhaps he was ashamed to be falling. He was sixteen years old.

He reached a point registered on GPS coordinates as N. 32.21.85/W. 113.18.93.

He fell again. He closed his eyes. He didn’t rise. He lay there for the length of the next day, lost in a delirium no one can even imagine, burning and burning.

Not a mile from Edgar, Abraham Morales tripped and hit the ground. He crawled, rolled on his side, kicked. His eyes were red. He was at N. 32.21.85/W. 113.18.94.

Nobody seemed to know him, for when they finally came and collected his body, he would lie neither claimed nor identified for a month, alone on his icy drawer.

Francisco Morales: “I do not know who was dying or how many because I too was dying.”

José de Jesús Rodríguez: “That day, at three in the afternoon, I was dead. What time is it right now—it is four o’clock. Yes, I died. I was dead from three o’clock to four o’clock. I revived and came back from the dead at eleven o’clock at night.”

Morales adds: “We were walking like robots.”

They could not bury their dead. There is some evidence they didn’t know who was dead, since they were all falling and fainting, and those who were awake didn’t always know what they were seeing.

They walked three, perhaps four miles farther. Men collapsed. It looked like more deaths were inevitable. Five of them decided to go ahead and see what they could find. Perhaps they'd find Mendez. Or the way. Anything.

"Wait for us," they said, but some of the men were already un-conscious, and nobody really said anything to them.

Wait Hell, they'd already waited.

"When we got sick," José Bautista says, "there was no shade. So I crawled up to hide in the rocks. One of the boys went crazy and started jumping up and down. He started screaming, 'Mama! Mama! I don't want to die!' He ran up to a big cactus and started smashing his face against it. I don't know what his name was."

Nahum and his companions were hiding in the trees.

A voice carried on the still air, crying, "Mother, save me!"

Mario González Manzano and his brother Isidro, far ahead on their attempt to find rescue, watched their brother walk away, in search of escape.

"Somebody said the freeway was right there, right over the hills," he said. "They lied."

Isidro and Mario were in luck: they found some prickly pears—*tuna* in Spanish. "We ate the tunas to stay alive," Mario says.

The liquid in the cactus fruits spared him. He would only see dead bodies when he got to a Border Patrol truck and saw them stacked inside.

The sign of the dead could be ghastly and haunting. One of the men tore off his shirt and tried to bury himself. The hither thither he left all around him showed violent kicking and arm flailing, as if he were swimming. He managed to get the top half of his torso buried in the ground, where he either smothered or passed out. The relentless heat baked him, literally cooking him in the ground. His face bloated and came loose from the bones tender as barbecued pork.

Reymundo Jr. collapsed in his father's arms. Reymundo held him as he died. Shook him, cried over him. He called for help, but the only thing that might have helped his son was water.

When Reymundo died and slid from his father's arms, his father lurched away into the desert, away from the trees, crying out in despair. Some of the men said he took the American money he had saved for their trip and tore it into small bits.

Julian Ambros Malaga was also said to have torn up his money. His brother-in-law, Rafael Temich, after being prodded by Julian to walk and save himself, was helpless to save him. "That's when he took out his money and started tearing it apart. And he took off alone and I also was demented. I was demented. I couldn't help him. I couldn't carry him. Then he threw himself into the sunlight, and that's where he stayed."

Old Reymundo also threw himself into the sunlight. He was shouting and crying and throwing money into the air, and he walked until he fell, trying to swim in the dirt as if he'd fallen into a cool stream.

Nobody knows the name of the man who took off all his clothes. It was madness, surely. He removed his slacks, folded them, and put them on the

ground. Then he took off his underwear, laid it neatly on the pants. He removed his shirt and undershirt and squared them away with the pants. As if he didn't want to leave a mess. His shoes had the socks tucked in them. They were placed on the clothes to keep them from blowing away.

He lay on his back and stared into the sun until he died.

Later, Kenny Smith, from Wellton Station, said, "This poor guy just crossed his ankles and went to sleep."

8. Journalist Reports on Killing of Women Maquiladora Workers in Juárez, 1997

Seven men were already in jail in Ciudad Juárez, charged in the serial murder of seventeen young women—the case apparently solved—when Sandra Juárez's body turned up on the banks of the Rio Grande.

One Saturday in July 1996 Sandra, seventeen, walked into Ciudad Juárez from Lagunillas, a village of forty adobe houses, thirty miles from the nearest telephone, in a parched region of the state of Zacatecas. She was no match for the city. On Monday she went looking for work in the *maquiladoras*—the assembly plants—that dominate the Juárez economy. A few days later they found her blouse on the Mexican side of the river. She lay strangled to death on the U.S. side. Her case has not been solved. No one knows where she went, or with whom, that Monday.

For the people of Ciudad Juárez, Sandra's case, and others that turned up that summer, played havoc with some accepted beliefs. Until then, for example, they had believed that the city's first serial-murder case, which had attracted news media from across Mexico and the United States, had been put behind them. They believed that a foreigner and a group of U.S.-style gang bangers were responsible. Given the town's border location, Juarenses are used to blaming things on people from somewhere else; 80 percent of the town's prison population is from somewhere else, is an oft-quoted statistic.

But about the time Sandra Juárez died, people in town finally had to start listening to Esther Chávez. Chávez is a thin, almost frail retired accountant who lives in a middle-class neighborhood of Juárez and wouldn't seem the type to get involved in a serial murder case. Nor did Chávez have much history of feminist involvement when she organized a women's group known as Grupo 8 de Marzo. But from newspaper clippings, Chávez had been keeping an informal list of cases involving dead young women ever since she noted the rape and murder of thirteen-year-old Esperanza Leyva on November 15, 1993. By that time the list was already thirteen cases long. "We had gone to talk to the mayor," Chávez says. "He promised to get higher authorities involved. He was my very good friend, but he never did anything for us. What we were trying to get people to see was a general climate of violence against women."

The cases were notable in that the identifiable victims were usually young and working-class. A good number had worked in the *maquiladoras*. These were not murders of passion, taking place in a bar or bedroom. Some of the women had been raped, many had been mutilated, and a good many more had been dumped like the worn-out parts to some machine in isolated spots in the deserts surrounding the city. Their killer or killers didn't even take the trouble to cover them with dirt, believing, with good reason, that the sun and the desert's scavengers would quickly wipe their corpses from the face of the earth. By the summer of 1996 Chávez had counted eighty-six of these cases, dating back to Esperanza Leyva in 1993.

Ciudad Juárez spreads low, bleak, and treeless across the valley floor south of El Paso and the Rio Grande. The smell of fetid sewers is a constant companion through town, a nagging reminder that the desert is no place for a major industrial center.

Years ago Juárez thrived because it understood that beneath America's puritan rhetoric, a buck was always waiting to be made. During Prohibition Juárez produced whiskey and beer and ran it across the border. Bars emerged along Avenida Juárez, the main drag leading to the bridge into El Paso, and have never left. "Divorce planes" brought American couples in to quickly end their marriages. To women looking for work, Juárez offered prostitution. Until the mid-1960s Juárez was a bustling city of sin.

Then the *maquiladoras* arrived. Over the next three decades the assembly plants turned dusty border outposts into major stops in the global economy, assembling televisions, telephones, appliances, clothes, calculators, car parts—all for export to the world's wealthiest market across the border. In Juárez several *maquiladoras* even count America's coupons.

Mexico began allowing *maquiladoras* on the border in 1964. The idea was to sop up migrant workers returning after the United States ended the so-called *bracero* treaty, a twenty-two-year-old agreement that allowed Mexicans to work seasonally and legally in America's fields. The *maquilas* began as an after-thought. But beginning in the late 1970s, the country lurched through recession after recession, and the peso steadily lost value. Many U.S. and foreign firms saw a payroll paid in a currency that always lost value as a nifty proposition. As Mexico staggered, the *maquiladora* sector along the border became an increasingly important job provider. Today [1997] some 970,000 people—mostly unskilled and low paid—work in more than 3,800 *maquiladoras*, completing in twenty-five years one of the most remarkable industrial transformations anywhere in the latter half of the twentieth century. Virtually all the plants are owned by foreign companies: General Motors, Ford, Hughes, Phillips, RCA, Sony, Toshiba, Daewoo, and on down to minor candy and clothing manufacturers.

Juárez saw the twenty-first century in the *maquiladora*. The city always had more *maquila* jobs than any other city—178,000 [by 1997]. As the *maquila* grew, so grew Juárez. The city went from 407,000 inhabitants in 1970 to about 1.5 million people [in 1997], with several thousand more wandering through in any given month.

But since in Mexico, border towns barely qualify as Mexican, Juárez is always last on the list when the central government in far-off Mexico City doled

out the resources. The city couldn't provide basic municipal services for everyone the *maquiladoras* pulled from the interior. Urban planning was an impossibility. And on a *maquiladora* salary, no worker could afford much rent. So shantytowns leaped into the desert. They were without drinking water, sewers, parks, lighting, or paved streets. An apocalyptic folk craft—shack building—developed, using plastic tarp and barrels, wood pallets, card-board, wire cord—anything that was *maquiladora* detritus. Bottle caps were used for bolts.

As Juárez grew, an anonymity that characterizes many large U.S. cities settled on it. Police make a lot of the fact that so many of the dead women—more than half on Chávez's list—are unidentified. Nor do they have missing person reports matching their descriptions. No one claims these bodies. Their families in some isolated part of Mexico may believe they're somewhere in the United States or simply don't care where they are. This, police say, is what they're up against.

But Juárez offered jobs, and that makes it like America in the most important way. Like the United States, Juárez attracted Mexicans from the interior who were restless and willing to risk a lot to change their lives. People from rural states of Durango, Zacatecas, and Coahuila continue to trudge into Juárez in huge numbers, figuring anything is better than the brutish life of the bankrupt Mexican *campo*. But unlike the United States, which attracts mainly men, Juárez became a magnet for women, especially young women. The *maquila* did and not, as Mexican planners hoped, employ many men returning from the United States. Instead the plants pulled young women to the border from deep in Mexico's countryside. In Juárez for many years, more than 80 percent of all *maquila* workers were women. Even today, with *maquila* work heavier, thirds of the *maquila* workforce is female. These were women with few of the skills that the industrial economy would reward. They were interchangeable and they moved frequently between jobs, which were generally similar in their monotony. Juárez thirsted for them, and the *maquilas* put up help-wanted banners that fly almost all year round.

One of the women that Juárez attracted was Elizabeth Castro, a seventeen-year-old who had come from the state of Zacatecas. On August 10, 1995, Castro's decomposing body appeared along a highway. At the time no one that much of it. For a few days she even remained unidentified. Then, the August and September, the bodies of more young women began show—several of them in Lote Bravo, a magnificent sprawl of caramel-colored south of the airport. The doctors autopsying the bodies said some showed of being raped. Several of them were too decomposed to identify. Presounded and headlines grew shrill. Juárez had seen a lot, but never this, reuses were comforted, however temporarily, by the arrest in early October of Abdel Latif Sharif, an Egyptian chemist. Police accused him of killing women, including Castro. (Witnesses were later found who said they'd and Elizabeth Castro in a club together.) The case finally had something Juárez was used to—Sharif was used to—a foreigner with a history. Sharif had lived in Florida for a number of years and there had been convicted of a variety of sex crimes against girls and spent time in prison. "When the United States deported him, he didn't return to Egypt. He came to Juárez.

Police claimed the forty-nine-year-old Sharif had been prowling the downtown clubs that *maquiladora* workers frequented, seducing young women, then

killing them. But Sharif said he was innocent, a scapegoat for police under public pressure. He predicted the bodies would continue to appear. He was right.

Lomas de Poleo is a stretch of desert west of town littered with the wind-blown trash of clandestine garbage dumpings. Within a few months of Sharif's arrest, the decomposing bodies of young women began appearing amid the debris. A goat herder found three of them.

It takes a lot to shock Juárez, but the continuing discovery of bodies did the trick. Civil patrols were now organized to protect children getting out of school and young women as they returned home from their *maquila* jobs. The shantytowns of Anapra and Lomas de Poleo formed squads to comb the desert areas for more corpses. The newspapers were filled with the latest news, clues, and conjecture about the case. Police competence was routinely questioned.

Then one night in April 1996 the police raided clubs along Avenida Juárez, the bar-studded drag leading from El Paso, where officers had been working undercover. They arrested a gang called Los Rebeldes (The Rebels). The police theorized that Sharif paid Los Rebeldes to kill women while he was in jail to make it seem that the real killer was still at large. And there stood the police case.

But then came the summer of 1996. More dumped bodies showed up. They continue to be found. So while evidence points to a serial murderer in some of the cases, what now seemed clear was that Juárez had something much larger on its hands.

Indeed, since the arrests of Los Rebeldes in early 1996, the bodies of almost fifty women have turned up. Rocío Miranda, a bar owner, was raped by seventeen young men, then dumped in a vat of acid. The only parts of Miranda that remained when she was found were her hands, feet, and the silicon implants that police used to identify her. Silvia Rivera, twenty-one, was stabbed to death by her husband and buried out near the prison; she was first identified and buried as one Elizabeth Ontiveros, who'd been reported missing, until Ontiveros showed up, having run off with her boyfriend. Soledad Beltrán, a stripper known as Yesenia, turned up in a drainage ditch, stabbed to death, her killers unknown. Sonia Yvette Ramírez, thirteen, was raped and killed and left a block from police headquarters. Her father spent two months tracking down her boyfriend, who had fled south to Chihuahua City. There he cornered him in an auto-repair shop, thrashed him, and turned him over to police, who charged him with Sonia's murder. Brenda Nájera, fifteen, and Susana Flores, thirteen, were both raped, tortured, and shot in the head. An autopsy showed Susana had had four heart attacks before dying. And there were more women who turned up whose identity still is unknown, leaving behind only the grimy detritus of a dime-store novel: a tattoo on the wrist, black jeans, fingernails painted dark red, green socks, white panties, a black bra, and often the signs of rape. One woman was found with two brassieres lying by her side. Two others were found on a motorcycle racetrack in the desert, wearing slippers and bathrobes.

There was no one thing—or one person or group—to pin the bodies on anymore. If a serial murderer was at large, there was a lot of horrible other stuff going on as well. It came to seem as if Juárez was awash in dead women merely because it was Juárez.

9. Newspaper Describes Increasing Violence of Drug Trade, 2010

Although Mexico has been a producer and transit route for illegal drugs for generations, the country now finds itself in a pitched battle with powerful and well-financed drug cartels. Top police commanders have been assassinated and grenades thrown, in one case into the crowd at an Independence Day celebration.

The authorities say most of the deaths have resulted from drug cartels fighting rivals. But soldiers and police have also been killed, as well as innocents.

The upsurge in violence is traced to the end of 2006 when President Felipe Calderon launched a frontal assault on the cartels by deploying tens of thousands of soldiers and federal police to take them on. Mr. Calderon has successfully pushed the United States to acknowledge its own responsibility for the violence in Mexico since it is American drug consumers who fuel demand and American guns smuggled into Mexico that are used by the drug gangs.

With the prospect of a quick victory increasingly elusive, a rising chorus of voices on both sides of the border is questioning the cost and the fallout of the assault on the cartels.

To many Mexicans, the rising count of gruesome drug-related murders is evidence that the government's strategy is not working. In September 2009, newspapers estimated the number of killings at more than 13,600 since Mr. Calderon took office.

The struggle began to effect relations with the United States as well. On March 13, 2010, gunmen believed to be linked to drug traffickers shot a pregnant American consulate worker and her husband to death in the violence-racked border town of Ciudad Juárez. The gunmen also killed the husband of another consular employee and wounded his two young children.

The shootings took place minutes apart and appeared to be the first deadly attacks on American officials and their families by Mexico's powerful drug organizations, provoking an angry reaction from the White House. They came during a particularly bloody weekend when nearly 50 people were killed nationwide in drug-gang violence, including attacks in Acapulco as American college students began arriving for spring break.

The killings followed threats against American diplomats along the Mexican border and complaints from consulate workers that drug-related violence was growing untenable, American officials said. Even before the shootings, the State Department had quietly made the decision to allow consulate workers to evacuate their families across the border to the United States.

In response to critics, Mr. Calderon has said his government was the first one to take on the drug trafficking organizations.

The strategy "has not only reversed the rising trend of crime and drug trafficking, but it has also weakened the conditions that allowed them to reproduce and to expand," Mr. Calderón said.

But Mexicans wonder if they are paying too high a price and some have begun openly speaking of decriminalizing drugs to reduce the sizeable profits the gangs receive.

Americans, from border state governors to military analysts in Washington, have begun to question whether the spillover violence presents a threat to their own national security and, to the outrage of many Mexicans, whether the state itself will crumble under the strain of the war.

While Mr. Calderon dismisses suggestions that Mexico is a failed state, he and his aides have spoken frankly of the cartels' attempts to set up a state within a state, levying taxes, throwing up roadblocks and enforcing their own perverse codes of behavior. The Mexican government has identified 233 "zones of impunity" across the country, where crime is largely uncontrolled, a figure that is down from 2,204 zones a year ago.

The authorities have made a string of high-profile arrests of drug chieftains and have had success seizing large amounts of illegal drugs, guns and money. But the violence remains high and authorities acknowledge that they will never wipe out this multi-billion-dollar-a-year industry. The goal now is to turn what is a national security problem into one that can be handled by law enforcement.

Responding to a growing sense that Mexico's military-led fight against drug traffickers is not gaining ground, the United States and Mexico set their counter-narcotics strategy on a new course in March 2010 by refocusing their efforts on strengthening civilian law enforcement institutions and rebuilding communities crippled by poverty and crime.

The \$331 million plan was at the center of a visit to Mexico in March by several senior Obama administration officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano.

The revised strategy has many elements meant to expand on and improve programs already under way as part of the so-called Mérida Initiative that was started by the Bush administration including cooperation among American and Mexican intelligence agencies and American support for training Mexican police officers, judges, prosecutors and public defenders.

Under the new strategy, officials said, American and Mexican agencies would work together to refocus border enforcement efforts away from building a better wall to creating systems that would allow goods and people to be screened before they reach the crossing points. The plan would also provide support for Mexican programs intended to strengthen communities where socioeconomic hardships force many young people into crime.

The most striking difference between the old strategy and the new one is the shift away from military assistance. More than half of the \$1.3 billion spent under Merida was used to buy aircraft, inspection equipment and information technology for the Mexican military and police. Next year's foreign aid budget provides for civilian police training, not equipment.

Military-to-military cooperation was expected to continue, officials said, despite reports by human rights groups of an increase in human rights violations by Mexican soldiers.

This revised strategy, officials said, would first go into effect in Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, the largest cities on Mexico's border with the United States. Ciudad Juárez, a city of 1.7 million, has become a symbol of the Mexican government's failed attempts to rein in the drug gangs.

The public outcry generated by the violence in Ciudad Juárez forced Mr. Calderón to acknowledge that the drug war would not be won with troops alone.

ESSAYS

In the first essay, York University political scientist Daniel Drache addresses the ways in which the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, changed border enforcement and diplomatic relations between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In the decades before 2001, economic needs, particularly the desire for open trade and access to markets, had led the United States to keep its borders relatively porous. But in the aftermath of 9-11, national security concerns led the American government to engage in much more restrictionist measures. For the first time, Canadian citizens were required to have passports to enter the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service was located in the new Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. government announced plans to build a wall along most of its border with Mexico and watchtowers along much of the Canadian border, and American vigilante groups such as the Minutemen began portraying illegal migration from Mexico as a leading national security threat. The 9-11 attacks, in short, were a watershed for North American borders. Drache concludes by criticizing the leaders of Canada and Mexico for not standing up to what he sees as the short-sighted goals of U.S. policy, and encourages them to cooperate with one another and appeal to Canadian and Mexican public opinion, which is much more cognizant of border policy than before.

In the second essay, University of California-San Diego sociologist David Fitzgerald explores the mixed views that Mexicans who remain in their country have of those who have migrated to the United States. Focusing on the town of Arandas in the state of Jalisco, Fitzgerald asks how Mexican culture and institutions attempt to maintain themselves as a large proportion of the population emigrates and returns. Although most Mexicans—migrants and non-migrants alike—believe that emigration has a positive economic impact, heavy majorities also believe that the supposedly more violent and materialistic American culture to which migrants are exposed is a threat to Mexican life. Accordingly, local authorities such as the police and church closely monitor returned migrants and are likely to blame them (even in the absence of hard evidence) for social problems such as drug use and HIV/AIDS infections. Although the Mexican government has recognized dual nationality since 1998, the Mexican public

continues to disapprove of Mexicans who become American citizens. Despite some predictions about the decline or disappearance of the nation-state in a new global age, Fitzgerald finds abundant evidence that nationalism is alive and well. Liberalized trade and mass migration have made border-crossing a factor of great importance all across North America, far from the international borders themselves. But North America remains a deeply divided ground in the twenty-first century.

Canada–U.S. Relations and the Impermeable Border Post 9/11: The Co-Management of North America

DANIEL DRACHE

Until September 11, 2001, Canadians had not thought very much or very hard about the long border they share with the United States. Nor had public authorities shown significant concern. There was no compelling imperative to contemplate it, particularly in this global age. Ideas passed through it, money poured over it and millions of people crossed it each year. Post-September 11, the border has changed beyond recognition. It is everywhere and everything. Issues now include enhanced security, protection of privacy rights, who Canadians want as citizens, how cross-border traffic can be expedited, and how open the border should be to political refugees.

In fact, the world's longest undefended border was never unimportant. It has always been at centre stage in North America in the exercise of power and international cooperation. For Americans it embodies the indivisibility of their national sovereignty and paramountcy of homeland security. It is symbolically as important as the constitution and the presidency. For Mexicans their frontier with the United States is the most iconic of institutions, inescapable and insurmountable linking together two radically different societies, economies and cultures in a thousand different ways. It embodies all their ambitions, pride, fears and insecurities; a remarkable contrast with the Canadian belief that its border is largely invisible and unchangeable.

Arguably, Mexicans, Canadians and Americans have come to understand each other less and less, and there are profound differences in how they think about the Great Border. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) downsized the importance of national boundaries and minimized their importance as regulatory gates and commercial walls. Now Canada and Mexico find themselves in a new tense relationship with the United States. The security wall is forbidding and its goals and aims controversial. Many of the old notions about a porous border no longer apply. The security needs of the United States now reach into their domestic space and the effects are pronounced.

Daniel Drache, "Canada–U.S. Relations and the Impermeable Border Post 9/11: The Co-Management of North America," *CONfines* 4 (Jan.–May 2008): 69–83. Also chapter in Drache, *Borders Matter: Homeland Security and the Search for North America*, with new introduction and material (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2007). Originally published in *Borders Matter Homeland Security and the Search for North America* (Halifax N.S.: Fernwood Publishing, 2004). Professor Daniel Drache is a full Professor and Acting Director of the Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University Toronto Canada and for more material North American integration go to www.yorku.ca/drache <<http://www.yorku.ca/drache>>.

Post-September 11, the border is expected to operate like a Kevlar vest, stopping everything in its path, without hindering the free movement of goods and services. What an abrupt turnaround from an age of free trade when openness was everything and security only a secondary consideration. Of course, it cannot be both, a security-tight border and a border geared for commerce with minimum restrictions at the same time. Eventually one must dominate the other. Ottawa has yet to absorb the fact that the commerce-first border that every business leader worked so hard to achieve is yesterday's story. North America's elites believed that they had settled the management of the two borders for at least a generation and that the NAFTA consensus could not unravel. The commercial border was to be out of public sight and out of mind and they could get on with the business of business. A decade later how short-sighted they were. North America is not evolving towards a European style of arrangements. Relations between Canada and the United States and Mexico and Washington are cooler than ever. The United States is pursuing a traditional policy of regional bilateralism striking deals with Canada and pressuring Mexico on immigration, the investment and border security.

The dilemma is that Americans also don't want a super-tight border economically. They don't want to be body-searched and, most emphatically, corporate United States does not want its Canadian production facilities to face delays when shipping goods back and forth across the border. It is in their interest to trade; and the United States will do business wherever it can for oil, manufactured goods and services of every description.

Many things look different for Canada in this security-obsessed age of strategy, might, and law. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Public Health and Bio-terrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002, and the Patriot Act of 2001 have placed management of the Canada-U.S. border directly under congressional and executive authority in ways that are unprecedented. All have had their authority renewed by the U.S. Congress by 2005 and this revolution in security policy will outlast the Bush presidency. These other along side measures authorize police and intelligence authorities to expand electronic surveillance and detain and remove aliens suspected of engaging in "terrorist activity."

These landmark bills grant sweeping powers to law enforcement agencies and increase the extralegal powers of the executive arm of government by means of executive and other administrative orders that do not require public hearings or obligate the president to ask Congress for additional authority. They rely on secret warrants or compulsory disclosures that expand the capability of the Justice Department to obtain warrants and conduct searches without publicly disclosing them immediately. Among other things, the new laws allow Internet monitoring, give police access to business records that include library and bookstore files, and authorize emergency searches and electronic surveillance. In the year after 9/11 the Department of Justice obtained 113 secret emergency search authorizations, compared to 47 in the twenty-three years prior to the attack. More than eight million FBI files were provided to the State Department and 85,000 records of suspected persons were turned over to the

Immigration and Naturalization Service. These expanded powers of the central security state would seem to violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. courts have been acquiescent in defending civil rights in an era of security.

September 11 redefined not only the border but also North America as a geopolitical region. So far Ottawa and Mexico remain uncertain as to how they should define themselves on the U.S. perimeter. They can play a symbolic "filler" role in the war against terrorism. When intervention requires a military presence as in Afghanistan, experts reckon that Canada can send up to 2,500 soldiers, although even that modest contribution stretches Canada's military to the limit. From a military point of view, Canada has little to offer the U.S. war machine. Mexico is even more skeptical of formalized joint military cooperation with its neighbour. It never participated in any kind of North American Aerospace Defense Command arrangement (NORAD) with the United States. It was not part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Given its size and policy of neutrality Mexico does not have a tradition of sending its military forces into joint operations. Mexico has had very limited participation in United Nations peace-keeping. Instead its security focus has been primarily domestically-oriented. No Mexican president is going to commit Mexican troops to a U.S.-sponsored initiative post 9/11.

With the Canada-Mexico-United States relationship no longer open-ended, Canada and Mexico must acquire a strategic culture for the twenty-first century. U.S. diplomacy is under intense scrutiny as never before. The transformed border is dramatically more complex with all its four dimensions in play as a security moat, regulatory fence, identity line in the sand for citizenship and a commercial opportunity. The challenge is to make all the ducks line up.

Canada has to become assertive about its side of the border. As a first priority it must conduct a full-scale audit of the U.S. Homeland Security and Patriot Acts to determine their impact on Canadian public policy and their cross-border. The Canadian government is handicapped because it has not consulted across government or with provinces about U.S. homeland security and its extraterritorial consequences for immigration, refugee policy, intelligence, commerce, and public regulation. The scope and speed of U.S. legislative and legal change is dramatic and unprecedented in recent times, and the Canadian public has not been kept fully informed.

By 2008, it is expected that U.S. border practices will have changed beyond recognition from what they were in 2003. The most telling is that Canadians will be required to have a passport to enter the U.S. and rather than the old standbys of a health card or driver's license. The era of 'flash and dash' are over. The idea of automatic access, minimum bureaucracy, and an easy going custom's officer is now a thing of the past. Every name on airline passenger lists will be checked and any that are questionable will be barred by U.S. authorities. Naturalized Canadians, those born elsewhere but have taken out Canadian citizenship, will face intense scrutiny if they emigrated from so-called high risk regions of the Middle East or South Asia. Political refugees also face new hurdles; no longer can Ecuadorians and Colombians be able to come through the United States and apply for refugee

status in Canada. They now are required to apply in the United States and if they are turned back, they cannot seek asylum in Canada.

In September 2006 Homeland Security announced that the U.S. plans to set up 800 watchtowers along the northern border to block illicit migration and effectively intrude into Canadian sovereign space. This unilateral decision underlines once again that Washington does not trust Canada to screen people entering the country. Despite all the rhetoric from the Harper government about rebuilding the Canada-U.S. relationship it is obvious that Washington does not have much confidence in all the effort and money Canada has spent on its security agenda. Harper's appeasement of the Bush administration is destined to fail.

Mexico does not want to mix security with trade, but now the line between these daunting policy areas is blurred and uncertain. Eight hundred surveillance towers are to be built on the southern border with the first installations to be constructed on the Arizona frontier with Mexico. Having a green card no longer means quick and automatic entry to the U.S. Migration policy is cross-cutting—virtually touching on every aspect of Mexico-U.S. relations. Immigration has become irreversibly linked to U.S. Homeland Security. Mexico's southern border is more than ever seen as a danger zone by U.S. security authorities. Gangs, narcotics and weapons move north through Mexico into the U.S. border patrols, border police, customs' officers and U.S. vigilante organizations guard the Mexico-U.S. border up and down the line.

Many of these changes do not simply focus on the U.S. border but on the processes behind and beyond the border. The globalization of U.S. domestic policy is driven by a singular aim: to secure the future of "our nation," "American democracy" and "border security" anywhere Washington believes it is threatened. It will decide what the "security danger" is and how it should be "neutralized." The choices for Canada and Mexico are stark—to be a tactical sceptic or a trusting loyalist. Either way the answer to this fundamental quandary has to be found in Canada and Mexico, not Washington. Ottawa has not thought through its strategic response to maximize its foreign policy assets. Belatedly it still needs to.

In other areas of U.S. public policy the role and importance of the border as a marker of exclusive national sovereignty has also been broadened, contrary to the theory and practice of economic integration. Free trade was to dismantle non-tariff barriers but U.S. practice is to make the U.S. security perimeter intrusive and invasive. A primary target is Mexico and its porous border. NAFTA was not meant to dismantle the border for immigration purposes. In 2002 the INS denied immigrant status to over 170,000 immigrants, most at the U.S. southwest border. Under the old rules more than 10,000 immigrants had been removed from the United States each year since 1995. Between September 2000 and November 2001 over 300,000 illegal migrants were apprehended on the southwest border. These numbers are expected to increase in the future. By 2005 removals had topped the one million mark.

Shortly after NAFTA came into effect, the Clinton administration passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 in order to closely monitor and control the cross-border movement of all non-U.S. citizens, or "aliens" as they are termed under U.S. law. The Act required the INS

“to collect and record the departure of every alien from the United States and match the records of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” It was aimed at Canadians and Mexicans who entered the United States illegally or remained beyond the permissible time period. The INS estimated that Canada was the fourth largest source of illegal immigrants, with about 120,000 Canadian aliens residing in the United States as of 1996. The INS studies also found that about 40 percent of all illegal immigrants enter the United States legally but stay without a visa.

Despite the protest from both Canadian and Mexican governments that this new legislation would impede entries and exits between the three countries, the U.S. Congress remained indifferent to its NAFTA partners. Section 110 of the Act generated a lot of bitter criticism from border communities that wanted U.S. legislators to separate domestic politics from the growing commercial interdependence between the three NAFTA partners and give Canadians and Mexicans a special status under the bill. Their advice carried no weight with U.S. lawmakers. The U.S. congressional view was that it possessed the competence to control and regulate the movement of people across U.S. borders and nothing in the NAFTA limited its right to do so. A tiny concession achieved by the Canadian government was to defer implementation of the Act until March 30, 2001. Now, with the passage of the Homeland Security Act, the new rules and regulations apply to Canadians as well as everyone else. Canada’s NAFTA status did not merit any special consideration.

If Canada and Mexico are to develop a strategic border culture, they need to reposition themselves in North America and defend their side of the Great Northern and Southern Border. To this end there are three basic principles that should be committed to memory and then acted on.

Protecting political refugees, poverty eradication, regional development and human rights, Canada and Mexico need to build leverage, acquire voice and co-ordinate their efforts. Kissinger was prescient when he wrote that ‘foreign policy is domestic policy’. If this is true for the United States, it doubly applies to Canada and Mexico, countries in which social diversity, hybridity, and multiculturalism define their respective national identities and are the strategic interests that must be nurtured and protected. Increasingly, foreign policy will have to reflect the social values of Canadian and Mexican society, rather than, as in the past, the special interests of their self-interested business elites. That is why if the NAFTA cousins expect to be a more effective actors globally, they have to connect with their publics in ways that they never did in the past.

The Stranger or the Prodigal Son?

DAVID FITZGERALD

When migrants return from the North laden with gifts for the annual patron saint fiesta, the municipal government receives them under a banner reading

"Welcome, Hijos Ausentes." Families reunite and dollars crackle through the local economy. Yet many residents, and even many migrants, resent the cultural changes that migrants bring back with them. A 1991 cartoon in a weekly newspaper expressed a common ambivalence toward *norteños*, the migrants with extensive experience in the United States. "January is here, it's fiesta ... and our *norteños*," reads the headline over a bird's-eye view of Arandas and a skull and crossbones on a road sign warning "ARANDAS: 15,000 NORTEÑOS." The caption reads, "And the worst part: in the U.S. they don't go out because they're afraid, and here, even their moms can't stand them. The solution? A new city for them, special schools, fines in dollars, concentration camps ...?"

The supposed transgressions of migrants are amplified because they take place during the fiesta celebrating the Virgin of Guadalupe, patron of Arandas and Mexico. The fiesta is also the town's main civic event, when the government self-consciously promotes local traditions of tequila, mariachis, and *charro* horsemen. Jaliscienses pride themselves on being the most Mexican of the Mexicans, and within Jalisco, Alteños pride themselves on being the most Jalisciense and Mexican of them all. Patron saint fiestas are a celebration of the sacred as well as a celebration of the collective self. At a fiesta for the hijos ausentes in a nearby town in Los Altos, a parade float juxtaposes the illegal drugs and homelessness of Chicago with the "idyllic, tranquil, family- and religion-centred life of the home town." Foreign "impurities" introduced by migrants are on public display during the fiesta and generate open controversy.

Asking how actors in the sending community try to maintain the cultural authenticity of migrants and the hometown flips the conventional question about the assimilation of immigrants that dominates studies of international migration. The mirror image of *assimilation*, the process of groups or individuals becoming similar, is *dissimilation*, the process of becoming different. Rather than ask how U.S. institutions attempt to integrate the immigrant population, I ask how Mexican institutions try to prevent the *disintegration* of the community of origin when emigrants leave and return. Those efforts involve a delicate balance between trying to take advantage of the economic and cultural advantages of emigration while trying to prevent the seepage of undesirable foreign ideas and practices into the home community. Long periods of socialization in another state's cage create many problems—and fewer opportunities—for the state, the Church, and other actors in the community of origin. A tension develops between attempts to extend the community by including extraterritorial members, as scholars of transnationalism have emphasized, and attempts to protect the community by monitoring returnees and moderating the effects of migration, a project consistent with the classical view of state-led nationalizing. This tension is obscured by the notion of a "transnational community," which misleadingly suggests a holistic cultural unit.

In the view of Alteños, the economic rewards of migration come at a steep cultural price. Attitudes about economic impacts in Arandas and Agua Negra were generally positive among household heads in the 2003 survey I conducted. Among the migrants, 88 percent thought emigration had a positive economic impact on the community, and 77 percent of nonmigrants thought the same.

More surprising is that migrants and nonmigrants in the sample were equally likely to report that migration has had a negative impact on the community's customs and morals; 77 percent of both nonmigrants and migrants held that view. Most Arandenses share an image of who is a good member of the community and who is a transgressor. Just as nonmigrants fear the corrupting influence of American culture on their hometown, migrants fear its corrupting influence on their own children, whether they are in the United States or Mexico. Church and state have developed practices such as the *hijos ausentes* fiesta to celebrate the "good" migrant, while distancing themselves from migrants who violate cultural norms.

Negative views of the cultural impacts of migration in Los Altos are consistent with national surveys; in 2006, twice as many Mexicans said the cultural influence of the United States has been unfavorable for Mexico (44 percent) as said it has been favorable (21 percent). On the other hand, the level of nationalism directed against the United States is mitigated when Mexicans look northward for a model of modernity. The suspicions of Mexican elites are "often allied to a sneaking admiration" that has become more pronounced with the advent of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement and a generation of technocrats schooled in top U.S. universities. Widespread ambivalence toward the effects of migration to the United States reflects a broader ambivalence toward the northern neighbor in general.

With the possible exception of the clergy and a handful of literati, most Arandenses say that the economic benefits of migration to the community outweigh the cultural costs. A former migrant who spent twenty-two years working in blue-collar jobs in factories in Los Angeles before returning to Arandas to become president chief of police expressed a common view: "The cultural problem of different customs that are taken from the United States through migration and brought here—customs which maybe don't go with the culture of Arandas, and so people say, 'These noisy characters come here and bring their loud music and walk around all tattooed and this and that'—I think that doesn't have the importance that foreign exchange income has for the country, its economic development, the transformation of the towns to a much better level of living, and better dwellings for its residents."

Alteño families often depend on remittances for economic survival, or at least have grown accustomed to the material comforts that remittances offer. Seventy-eight percent of households in Agua Negra and 44 percent in Arandas include at least one migrant. The norteño is not an exotic character, but one's husband, son, nephew, or cousin. Most people know that migrants suffer on their journey despite all their bravado and stories of adventure. An Alteño adage expresses residents' two minds toward migrants who bring home dollars and arrogant attitudes, yet who must often borrow money to return to the North after the fiesta: "When they come, they strike fear, and when they leave, they strike pity."

For Arandenses to describe and explain how migrants are changed by their experiences in the United States, migrants first must be identified and monitored.

In Arandas, the clearest form of social labeling of emigrants is applied to the subset who have settled abroad for long periods, the *norteños*.

How do residents of Arandas, a town of forty thousand, decide who is a *norteño*? When asked in interviews, Arandenses usually listed the same set of cues: Young, male, urban migrants wear baggy or short pants, tattoos, earrings, and gold necklaces. Their head is shaved or they wear their hair long. Both men and woman dye their hair, the only cue Arandenses mentioned for (young) migrant women. Most Arandenses called this a *cholo* style. Labeling migrants is an inexact science: Imitators who have never left Los Altos have access to migrant styles through locally produced copies or the gifts of returnees, and migrants who avoid the *cholo* aesthetic do not display obvious cues. It is harder to tell a returned migrant from a nonmigrant when both sport the popular *ranchero* look of boots, jeans, *sombrero*, and buttoned shirt, though the apparent expense of these fashions and accompanying gold chains are more subtle indicators of migrant status. The behavior of migrants dressed in a *ranchero* or generic urban style is not as readily categorized as *norteño*. Consequently, the behavior of the *cholos* receives greater scrutiny and disproportionately influences the public sense of how migrants behave. All of my local informants expressed negative views of *cholos*.

The personal presentation of earlier generations of migrants was the object of similar negative reactions from a government preoccupied with sculpting the modern Mexican man while maintaining social solidarity. The Secretariat of Labor's 1946 surveys of returning *braceros* found that more than a third of the returnees had changed their "normal" way of dress to clothes that were "expensive, flashy, exaggerated" and "uncomfortable and inappropriate for the milieu of their origin." The study's authors argued that "this mutation in their clothing can be explained as the satisfaction of desires unsatisfied and repressed for a long time, and the desire to appear original and to distinguish themselves in their home environment and signal themselves as recent visitors from the United States."

Vehicles also telegraph signals that identify migrants. Symbols of Americana such as decal flags, U.S. license plates, English-language music pulsating from sound systems, chrome detailing, and dramatic driving styles all display migrant status.

The disorder created by returned migrants can become a policing issue. Just across the Guanajuato state line in Manuel Doblado a government billboard reads, "Welcome to your land, *paisano*. We invite you to respect the rules of your town." In neighboring parts of Michoacán in 1907 police opened a checkpoint at the local train station to register returnees by collecting information on their Mexican place of residence, the weapons they carried, and details of their migration to the United States. Today even the police use informal membership categorization to monitor migrants, rather than checking official identification papers.

In Arandas, police trouble with returnees does not generally include serious, sustained violence. A former municipal president who served in the 1950s said that rambunctious returnees are "a bother, but there are other, more important crimes for the government to worry about." Another former municipal president from 1990s said he ordered police to confiscate the car stereos of those who played their music too loud. The incoming police chief, a former migrant

himself, launched a publicity campaign promising to crack down on people who drive aggressively and play loud music. He aimed the measures at the entire population but considered *norteños* the primary offenders.

Control over members' bodies is one of the goals shared by Church and state in their exercise of pastoral power. Migrants are blamed for the introduction of illegal drugs and increased consumption of alcohol. In 1946, the Secretariat of Labor found that *braceros* drank more alcohol upon their return than before they had left. According to a 1997 study by the government of Jalisco, in rural communities with high levels of emigration migrants were eleven times more likely than nonmigrants to have used at least one of a set of drugs including solvents, marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. And a 2003 report on the condition of migrants commissioned by the government of Jalisco warned of "the presence of mental health problems and addictions originating in the loss or alteration of their original customs and the necessity to adopt new ways of life." Jalisco has a "Go Healthy, Return Healthy" program in twenty-seven counties of high emigration to discourage drug use and other unhealthy behaviors. In Arandas, the portfolio of one of the council members includes combating drug addiction. "There is a very close relationship between the addiction of the Arandense and traveling to the United States," he said. While the overwhelming weight of the public discourse in Arandas about drugs blames outsiders in general and migrants in particular, there are exceptions. At the outset of an antidrug crusade in the 1980s sponsored by the Church with support from local government, a prominent editorial from an ex-migrant in *El Arandense* urged Arandenses to stop pointing the finger at outsiders and start recognizing their own culpability for the drug problem in Arandas.

Blaming sexually transmitted diseases on outsiders is another way for Arandenses to set themselves apart from the rest of Mexico and the United States as more Catholic and morally pure. There were twenty-two known cases of AIDS in the county of Arandas in 2003. Arandenses blame migrants for bringing back AIDS from the United States, though according to the government of Jalisco, of the nearly seven thousand cases in the state reported from 1983 to 2001, only 6 percent were people who had lived in the United States for more than six months. The county doctor blames venereal diseases such as syphilis on men who have returned from northern fleshpots, rather than the clandestine sex industry in certain roadside bars outside Arandas. Several of the local elites I interviewed, including priests and a prominent PAN politician, claimed that migrants were responsible for the introduction of homosexuality to Arandas.

Many Mexicans believe that the lack of moral discipline in private U.S. religious and family life promotes undisciplined behavior in both countries. They see migrants as cut loose from the conservative Catholicism of Los Altos and adrift in a heterogeneous religious environment where they are preyed upon by the proselytizing of Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Evangelicals, or simply lured into religious apathy by a more secular U.S. society. The loosening of family bonds generally and the absence of watchful wives in particular are also thought to promote vice and immorality among men.

Most Arandenses think that cultural dissimilation, becoming less like "us" and more like "them," is usually a bad thing. Government employees, priests, and the press monitor migrants to mitigate those cultural impacts and reinforce their pastoral power. The drugs, criminality, and disease that North Americans often blame immigrants for importing to the United States are seen in Mexico as *exports* from the United States to Mexico via emigrant carriers. On both sides of the border, the same practices are viewed as foreign pathologies. For those in the business of maintaining national and local purity within the territorially defined community, migration is a threatening conduit of cultural change.

One of the legal indicators of dissimilation is the loss of Mexican citizenship when migrants naturalize in the United States. Residents of Arandas and Agua Negra draw a distinction between migrants in general and migrants who become U.S. citizens. Many Alteños object to the transformation of Mexicans into U.S. citizens and the idea of dual nationality. The extent of this contention belies the notion that migrants and those who stay behind form part of one "transnational community." The old-fashioned nationality in a single nation-state apparently matters to many residents of source communities, who are not all enthusiastic about the possibilities of a "trans-" or "postnational" society.

The more negative views regarding migrants who naturalize in the United States are accompanied by negative attitudes toward dual nationality. Since 1998, Mexican law has allowed Mexicans by birth to hold both Mexican and foreign nationalities. Ninety-two percent of migrants and only 68 percent of nonmigrants support the right to dual nationality. A logistic regression found that nonmigrants, people without a migrant in their household, women, and Agua Negrans were significantly more likely than migrants, people with a migrant in their household, men, and people living in the city of Arandas to oppose the right to dual nationality. Dual loyalties appear more threatening to people with less direct experience with migration or the greater social diversity found in towns.

The myth of being forced to trample or spit on the Mexican flag as part of the U.S. naturalization ceremony remains ubiquitous in Mexican migrant source communities and among many immigrant Latinos in the United States. Negative attitudes toward migrants who become U.S. citizens have probably contributed to historically low naturalization rates for Mexicans in the United States, but such attitudes may be waning. The percentage of Mexican immigrants in the United States who have naturalized climbed from 15 in 1994-95 to 25 in 2000-2001. Growing public acceptance of naturalized emigrants in Mexico would likely contribute to a further rise in U.S. naturalization, especially as Mexico has legally recognized dual nationality since 1998.

Arandense intellectuals complain in public about the cultural side of denationalizing. According to editorials in the local newspapers, U.S.-style Christmas and Halloween celebrations are two of the biggest expressions of migrants' cultural degeneracy. For example, in a front-page Christmas Day editorial in 1993 headlined "Santa Claus Should Disappear," *El Arandense* decried the displacement of nativity scenes by Christmas trees and the invasion of secular, materialistic values

from the United States that pollute the local religious tradition. A municipal president in the 1990s ordered the publication of material condemning Halloween as a foreign import and promoting the celebration of the authentically Mexican Day of the Dead. A 1990 editorial in *Notiarandas* took up the same crusade against Halloween, which it saw as part of the cultural "invasion" of migrants "who come to Mexico to do what they can't do in the United States, and in so doing trample on our beautiful traditions."

Doña Marina is the name that the Spanish conquistadors gave to La Malinche, an indigenous woman who betrayed her people to become the mistress of leader Hernán Cortés. *Malinchismo*, a syndrome of preferring the foreign to the authentically native, has its modern incarnation in *pochismo*, the phenomenon of people of Mexican descent born in the United States acting like gringos. *Malinchismo* and *pochismo* loom large in Mexican nationalism and are rhetorically powerful slurs used by Arandense elites during interviews. Even college-educated nonmigrants tend to see norteños' U.S.-born children in subtractive cultural terms as having "no culture" because they fall between two discrete cultural systems.

Some migrants see themselves as "taking the best from here and there" in what researchers would call an additive cultural hybridization of two systems. A former migrant who lived in California and Illinois for ten years before returning to publish *El Arandense* subscribes to the additive view of culture, but he said he was socially rejected when he returned. He blamed the negative reception on the "inferiority complex" of Arandenses who stayed behind: "If you said that you were coming from the United States, many people scorned you.... A lot of people here, for this same inferiority complex, wanted to tell you that the culture there was not appropriate for the culture here, that it was a lower culture, that it would harm them."

Linguistic shifts are another site of cultural contention. During summer vacation and the patron saint fiesta, groups of returnees can be heard speaking English in the streets of Los Altos. The lay head of the migrant ministry in Agua Negra says that when returnees speak English with each other, she and her friends tell them, "Shh, shh, you're in Mexico!" Residents complain that "mental *gabachos*" born in Mexico or the "pocho" children of Mexican origin born in the United States anglicize their Spanish pronunciation and invent hybrid neologisms such as *parquear* (to park) and *marqueta* (market). Learning English is seen as an accomplishment, and nonmigrant elites often send their children to learn English in local private classes, but "losing" Spanish is viewed as a moral failure and a rejection of being Mexican. Arandenses who have visited the United States as tourists often tell stories of interacting with people of Mexican origin there "who don't want to speak Spanish even though you can tell by looking at them" that they do speak Spanish. The folk theory is that their reticence is "because they are ashamed of their roots." Mexican visitors often fail to understand that many of the second or later generations simply don't speak proficient Spanish, and perhaps never had a facility to lose in the first place. For all the fears in the United States that immigrants and their children are not learning English fast enough, the second generation prefers to

speak English, and away from the border region the third generation rarely speaks Spanish with any proficiency.

In interviews, elites frequently referred to the problems putatively caused by Mexicans in the United States as an embarrassment to Mexico. The middle and upper classes emphasize that migrants are drawn disproportionately from the ranks of people "sin cultura" (without culture)—a category that captures both the economic class and cultural status dimensions of "low-class." The distancing of Mexican elites from migrants has been a regular theme since the early twentieth century, when Mexican consular officials called on officials in Mexico to stop the emigration of poor workers because it was giving Mexico a bad image abroad. Resentment of migrants' class mobility is also a factor. The wage differential between Mexico and the United States means that people with little education who migrate to the United States and then return are often richer than professionals who never left Mexico. As one entrepreneur described his youth in Arandas in the 1970s, "I was studying and saw migrants returning. I asked myself, 'How come someone who doesn't even read or write is doing better than me?'" Professionals are frustrated by the economic success of nouveau riche migrants who return to Arandas.

Resentment of class mobility is only a partial explanation for the negative attitudes about the cultural transformations wrought by migration, however. Such negative attitudes are the norm among nonmigrants and migrants across the population. Migrants often fear the cultural shifts in their own Americanizing children. Household heads in Agua Negra were just as likely as household heads in Arandas to say they had a negative view of migration's cultural effects, even though there are no real "elites" in Agua Negra, where social stratification is limited to the division between poor farmers with their own land and even poorer day laborers. The class dimension of talk about emigration's negative effects is subsumed by culturally driven fears of destructive influences.

Many of the problems attributed to migration, and state responses attempting to manage those problems, become visible in public education. Teachers throughout the historic sending areas complain that widespread migration encourages adolescents to drop out of school and migrate themselves. In an interview with a Catholic weekly newspaper, the director of the technical secondary school in Arandas said the principal problem with the student population was the dropout rate: "Many students go to the United States. A very large number of boys come and enroll, but come December, their friends from the North come back with cash, and off they go [in January]." In the primary school in Agua Negra, the director said the students were too young to talk about their plans to migrate, but the school's population fell 20 percent between 1980 and 2003 as whole families migrated to the United States, León, and Arandas. Consequently, the Secretariat of Public Education stripped the school of one of its seven teachers. Migration also contributes to school absenteeism for the estimated 7 percent of students who join the corn harvest in November and December because their fathers left crops in their care. All ten of the educators interviewed agreed that migration was implicated in disciplinary problems at school.

The perpetuation of migrants' cultural nationality through state education in Mexico and the United States is an explicit policy of the government of Mexico and the state of Jalisco. In their 2000 Declaration of Puebla, the directors of state offices of attention to migrants abroad said their sports and cultural programs were designed to keep *paisanos* "away from the vices and practices alien to our values, principles, and customs." Mexican consulates have distributed thousands of Spanish-language text-books to schools in the United States, raising the hackles of U.S. nationalists for referring to the stars and stripes as "the enemy flag" and portraying the 1846–48 Mexican-American War as a disaster. According to a 2003 report, the state of Jalisco seeks to "preserve and strengthen our traditions, values, and national identity" for the benefit of 4.5 million Jaliscienses abroad. Thirteen Jalisciense teachers that year participated in an exchange program to teach in public schools in areas of Jalisciense concentration in California, Michigan, and Illinois.

On the local level, the director of the primary school in Agua Negra explained that the civic education classes are designed to inculcate patriotism. On September 16, when Mexico's independence from Spain is celebrated, school-children parade through Agua Negra. "We want them to learn to be well cemented in their values here so that they don't adopt the customs of the North. In the United States, morals are more liberal than they are here," he said. When asked what values are important to inculcate in Agua Negra, he mentioned honor, solidarity, antimaterialism, family unity, and patriotic values "so they don't disown their motherland when they're in the United States."

In the minds of educators, migration is a major channel for the introduction of undesirable American culture.

Cultural representations of migrants are sometimes contradictory in rural communities, whose residents already feel unsettled by the pace of change as they become more integrated into the rest of the nation and the world. Celebrations of the "absent son" who leaves to provide for his family contrast with more ambivalent representations of the "prodigal son" who returns to his family after learning that the American dream is an illusion. The *norteño* can even become like Georg Simmel's "stranger," who reminds the community of what its culture is by showing what it is not. Representations of the *norteño-as-stranger* allow Arandenses to invert the status hierarchy by asserting the moral superiority of local traditions and ways of life against the *agringado* customs of the migrant. These culture wars *a la mexicana* influence outcomes as diverse as how migrants maintain ties with their hometowns and employers' hiring decisions.

For migrants, events such as the *Señorita Arandas* pageant and the winners' tour of Jalisco are ways to claim that migrants still are moral members of the community. Neatly coiffed young women dressed in styles reminiscent of the nineteenth century are attempting to establish an alternative schema for *norteños*, in contrast to the predominant *cholo* schema of a young man with shaved head and tattoos driving recklessly through the plaza, playing rap music and shouting out the window. The religious procession of *hijos ausentes* and the luncheon with mariachi music extolling the absentee and his nostalgia for Arandas are institutional venues where mainstream migrants, the Church, and the state join to display their idea of a proper moral order. The Mexican government at various

levels attempts to socialize the population in Mexico and even Mexicans in the United States through educational and cultural programs that promote a sense of *mexicanidad* and local ties. Hometown association projects such as donating an ambulance create prestige by showing not only that migrants have wealth, but that they are using their wealth for the benefit of the community. All of these activities are important ways to maintain hometown ties.

In short, the cultural transformations wrought by migration crystallize a fundamental ambivalence about the influence of the United States and how to enjoy the fruits of modernity and economic growth without sacrificing patriotism, faith, and social solidarity. Cultural nationalists in countries of emigration are concerned with the dissimilation of emigrants and the disintegration of their communities brought on by emigration. This negotiation takes place in a broad cultural field that transcends the territorial border between the United States and Mexico, but it is hardly the open field of free-flowing people and ideas proclaimed by the globalists. Some actors in Mexico are actively intervening in that cultural landscape with attempts to repair the bars of the nation-state's cage.

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